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usefulness and value. Whether it was in condition to be given
to the world by another hand, the present writer is ignorant.
As a writer, Professor DEAN was characterized by industry,
accuracy, and great carefulness in the examination of authorities,
and by clearness and unambitious simplicity of language in express.
ing his conclusions. He was not a great author, nor a great law.
yer, but he held a fair rank in that honorable class of the profession who are learned, prudent, and trusty. counsellors in the affairs
of men.
The proprieties of the occasion will be sufficiently served in the
1resent notice, by adding, that Professor DEAN was marked by
ingenuousness and sincerity, by freedom from all obtrusive self-assertion, by extraordinary kindness of hearf, and simplicity of manners.
He was genial and confiding in his social relations, earnest and
faithful in the discharge of all the duties of his various positions.
His personal character was unblemished by any vices. *He was
constantly putting forth influences for good upon all classes of the
community, and especially upon young men, who, at the threshold
of active life, were in need of direction, encouragement, support,
and instruction. By the great number of this class with whom he
wNas in one way or another connected, and by a very large circle of
personal friends, his death is felt as a great loss.
3. T. M.
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DECISIONS.

-Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
WILLIAM P. JETT v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.
Passing a counterfeit note of a national bank is an offence for which an indict
ment will lie in a state court, under the laws of the state.
There is nothing in the relations of the state and Federal courts or in the nature
of the jurisdiction itself, which makes the jurisdiction of the United States courts
to punish the act of passing counterfeit national bank-notes, necessarily exclusive.
Nor is it made so by Act of Congress.
i The conicurrent jurisdiction of-the national and state courts considered .and'di1.
cussed

Per JoTYxEs, J.

THis was a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania
The plainitiff in error was prosecuted in the court below and
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convicted under the statute of Virginia (Code of 1860, chap. 193,
sec. 3), of the offence of uttering and attempting to employ as
true a forged bank-note purporting to be a note of The Fourth
National Bank of Philadelphia.
motion was made to arrest the judgment on the ground that
the courts of the state have no jurisdiction to entertain a prosecution for that offence.
The motion was overruled and judgment entered on the verdict, whereupon the defendant took this writ of error.
-E.
.Dabney and .E.Barksdale, Jr., for plaintiff in error.The prisoner was indicted under. the law of Virginia making it
forgery to make or utter any counterfeit " note or bill of a banking company." -The offence charged was uttering a counterfeit
note of The Fourth Xational Bank of Philadelphia, a bank formed
under the authority 'of the Act of Congress of June 3d 1864.
This act provides for the punishment of the offence of uttering
"orged notes of such banks.
The 'Act of Congress of September 24th 1789, known as the
-Judiciary Act, provides that-the Circuit Courts of the United
States "shall have exclusive cognisance of all crimes and offences
cognisable under the authority of the United- States," unless the
laws of the United States otherwise direct.
Wben Congress declares any act to be an offence against the
United States, and provides for its punishment as such, it is not
competent for the courts of a state to entertain a"prosecution
founded upon the same act, under a law of the state making it an
offence against the state, unless the express consent of Congress
has been given for that purpose. Congress has not given such
consent in respect to the offence of uttering forged notes of the
national banks.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOYNES, J.-The act described in the indictment is simply a
cheat, practised or attempted by one citizen of Virginia upon
anothcr, by means of a forged paper purporting to be a bank-note.
Whether the forged paper by which such a cheat is effected or
attempted, purports to be the note of a state bank or the note of
a national bank, the offence pertains equally to those matters of
internal police, which, by the acknowledged theory of our insti-
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tutions, belong generally to the jurisdiction of the states. This
jurisdiction of the states constitutes a. cardinal feature of our
system of government. Whether in respect to the particular
offence described in the indictment, it is superseded and displaced
by the paramount jurisdiction 'of the United States, is the question. now before us. It is a grave and important question. It
involves the relative rights and powers of the state and Federal
governments, and the rights and liabilities'of the citizen in respect
to both. And is also a question of practical importance. The
authorities of the state are dispersed throughout all parts of the
Commonwealth, and it is reasonable to suppose that the detection
and punishment of this class of offences will be more effectually
secured by them than they can be if confided only to the authorities of the United States, who are few in number and confined
to a few local ities. If, however, the jurisdiction over this class
of offences belongs exclusively to the United States, we ought
not to usurp it, and have no disposition to do so. If, on the other.
hand, it belongs to the state, we have no right to surrender it.
In the language of the Supreme Court, "the duties of this court
to exercise jurisdiction where it is conferred, and.not to usurp it
where it is not conferred, are of equal obligation. The Constitution, therefore, and the law are to be expounded without leaning
the one way or the other :" Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch
Rep. 87.
It is not necessary in this case to consider at large the construction of section 2, article 3 of the Constitution of the United
States in relation to the judicial power, or the cases in which the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is exclusive; or
those in which a 6oncurrent jurisdiction may be exercised by the
courts of the several states. The rules by which these two classes
of cases are to be discriminated, do not appeat to be precisely
determined by the decisions of the Supreme Court, as may be
seen.from the case of The .Moses Tayflor, decided at the last term
of that court and reported in 4 Wallace's .Rep. 411. That case,
however, affirms it to-be a general rule, that while the judiciql
power of the United States is, in some cases, unavoidably*exclusive of all state authority, it may be made so in all others at the
election of Congress.
. It cannot be questioned that the class of offences to which that
now before us belongs, was within the jurisdiction exercised by
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the states before the adoption of the Federal Constitution.. The

jurisdiction over this class of offences still belongs to the states.
unless they surrendered or lost it in the formation of that Consti
tution. To show that they did so, it is not enough, according tc
the acknowledged rule of construction, to show that jurisdiction
over the same class of offences was granted to the United States
by the Constitution. To deprive the states of an authority or
jutisdiction which they had before the adoption of the Constitution, there must be either an express grant of exclusive authority
or jurisdiction over the same subject or. class of cases to the United
States ; or there must be a grant of authority or jurisdiction to
the United States- not in terms exclusive and an express- prohibition against the exercise of like authority or jurisdiction by the
states ; or there must be authority or jurisdiction granted to the
United States,. to which a similar authority or jurisdiction in the
states would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant: Federalist, No. 82 ;"Id., No. 82; Houston v. Moore, 5
Wheat. Rep. 1; 1 Kent Com. 400; Story on Constitution, §§
436-447.
In the present case there is no express grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, nor any express prohibition to the
states. If, therefore, the states have lost their ancient jurisdiction over any offence of this class, it must be because jurisdiction
.over the offence has been given to the United States to which a
like jurisdiction in the .states would be wholly contradictory and
repugnant.
Congress having, as must be assumed, aulhority to establish the
system of national banks, had authority to protect their circulation from being discredited by counterfeits, in order to secure the
usefulness of the system. When, therefore, the forged note employed in effecting a cheat, purports to be the note of a national
bank, Congress has a right to declare the act of uttering or
attempting to pass such note to be an offence against the United
States, and has accordingly done so. Literally speaking, the Act
of Congress and the statute of the state punish the same identical
act, namely, the act of uttering or attempting to pass as true the
forged note. But the two statutes aim at the accomplishment of
different objects ; the authority under which they were enacted is
derived from different sources, and though the offence which each
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of them punishes is comprised in one and the same act, there is
really an essential difference in the character of the two offences.
There is nothing peculiar in respect to the law of the state or
to the offence now in question, to render the jurisdiction of the
state courts, under the law of the state, incompatible with that of
the Federal courts under the Act of Congress, if it would not be
so, *upon general principles, in all cases whatsoever. The law )f
the state is in entire harmony with the Act of Congress, and seeks,
though for different reasons and in p-drsuance of a different
policy, to effect the same object, to wit, the suppression of
6ounterfeits.
A conflict of jurisdiction between the Federal and state courts
may occur under different circumstances. Thus, an Act of Congress and the statute of a state may declare the same identical
act to be an offence ; as for example, the act of counterfeiting the
coin, or the ict of uttering and passing counterfeit coin, In other
dases the Act of Congress and the law of the state are aimed at
different offences, but in doing an act prohibited by the Act of
C6ngress, the offender also does an act prohibited by the law of
the state. For instance, a party may commit the;offence of robbing the mail, and commit, at the same time, the offence of assault
and battery. In the discussions to -which this subject has given
rise, these and probably other -distinctions have been claimed to
make a difference in the principle governing the cases. At an
early period after the adoption of the Constitution, an eminent
jurist expressed the opinion that a man couid not, by doing any
one act, violate, at the same time, the laws of the Uvited States
and the laws of any one of the states, and that where a party, in
the course of doing an act which violates a law of the United
States, also does an act which violates the law of a state, he
really commits but one offence, and. that the offence against the
United States, or[ the ground that the greater crime includes and
swallows up the less: Letter of Judge CHASE to the Governor of
Maryland, October 6th 1794, Journal of Jurisp. 262. An able
writer, at a much more recent period (1845), advocated a similar
view in'respect to certain'offences, on the ground that an offe'nce
against one state ought to be considered as merged in-an offence
against all the states: 4 Am. Law Magazine 318, 334-340.
Others, while admitting that the same act .may be declared an
offence both by Act of Congress and by state law, and punished
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tinder either one, have contended that a judgment of conviction
or acquittal under either one may be pleaded in bar of a prosecution under the other, and that according to the rules of comity
which prevail between concurrent jurisdictions, the one which
first attaches should be allowed to proceed to judgment: Per
WASHINGTON, J., H1ouston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; Rawle on
Const. 205-206.
Others again have contended, as a general proposition, that
when any act has been declared by Congress to be an offence
against the United States, it is incomljatible and repugnant for a
state legislature to declare the same act to be. an offence against
the state. This has been maintained chiefly on the ground that
the offender would be thereby exposed to be twice punished, or
twice put in jeopardy for the same offence. This view was maintained by the Suprene Court of Missouri, in the case of Hattison
v. TLe State, 3 Mo. R. 421, and by Mr. Justice McLEAN, in the
two cases hereafter cited -from 5 Howard and 14 Howard
The conflict- and variety of opinions on this subject may be
further'seen by reference to the following cases: State v. Antonio,
3 Brevard's R. 562; State v., Tutt, 2 Bailey's R. 44; Commonwealth"v. Fuller, 8 Mete. R. 313 ; State v. Wills, 2 Hill's S. C.
R. 657; State v. Harlan,1 Dougl. Mich. R. 207 ; Rouse v. State,
4 Ga. R. 136; Hendrick's UCase, 5 Leigh's R. 709.
I have made this brief allusion to some of the conflicting views.
which have been entertaibied on this subject, in order to .show the
confusion and perplexity in which it has, until recently, been
involved, and the importance and value of'the decisions of the
Supreme Court, to which I shall now refer.
The first of the cases alluded to is that of Fox v. State of Ohio,
5 Howard Rep. 410, decided in 1847.
The precise question in that case was, whether the state of
Ohio had authority to provide by law for punishing the o-ffence
of passing counterfeit coin. The case was very fully and ably
argued. Mr. Justice McLEAN was of opinion that such a power
could not be exercised by Ohio, because it would be incompatible
with the.exercise of the same power by the United States, which
he thought clearly existed. But all the other judges concurred
in holding that the state possessed the power.
There are some expressions in the opinion in that case which
throw doubts upon the power of Congress to provide for punishing
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the offence of passing counterfeit coin. But the case was not
put on that ground, and subsequent parts of the opinion affirm
the right of the state to provide for punishing the act of passing
counterfeit coin as.an offence against the state, eve, though Congress should provide, and havy the right to do so, for punishing
it as an offence against the United States. The'court further
held, that if the party should be punished twice for the same act,
i', could not complain that the 5th article of the Amendments to
the Constitution had been violated, which provides that no person
shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb, but that, in point o~f fact, the beni'gnant spirit in
which both the state and Federal systems are admixiistered 'would
preclude all danger of such double convictions, unless it might
be in cases of special enormity or demanding unusual rigor.
In Unlited. States v. Marigold, 9 Howard Rep. 560, it was
held, that Congress had the power to protect the coin by providing for the punishment of persons who bring counterfeit coin into
the United States with intent to pass it, and also for the punishment of persons who utter and pass any-such counterfeit coin.
The court dxpressly re-affirm what it was said was' laid down in
Foz v. State of Ohio, "with a view Qf avoiding conflict between
the state and Federal jurisdictions," namely, "that the same act
may, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it
involves, constitute an offence against both the state and Federal
governments, and may draw to its commission thp penalties
demanded by either, as appropriate to its character in reference
to each?'.
The same principle was again affirmed in .Moore v. People 'of
Illinois, 14 Howa'rd Rep. 13. That was an indictment in a court
of the state of Illinois, under a statute of that state, for harboring a fugitive slave. It was Contended that th6 statute of the
state was void because it provided for the punishment of the same
act for which, by the Act of Congress of 1793, the offender was
subjected to a'penalty of t500, to be recovered -by the owner of
the slave, and that s6. the party would be subject to a double
punishment for the same offence. The court held, that the two
statutes did not provide for the -punishment of the same identical
acts ; but that even if they had done so, the consequences insisted on would not have followed. The'language of the court
on this point is very clear and emphatic. "But admitting," said
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the court, "that the plaintiff in error may be liable to an action,
under the Acts of Congress, for the same act of harboring and
preventing the owner from retaking his slave, it does not follow
that he would be twice punished for the same offence. An
offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a
law..
A man may be compelled to make reparation in damages
to the injured party, and be liable also to punishment for a
breach of the public' peace; in consequence of the same act, and
may be said, in common parlance, to be twice punished for the
same offence. Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance
to btro sovereigns,-and may be liable to punishment for the infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence
[under], or transgression of, the laws of. both. Thus, an assault
upon the marshal of the United States, and hindering him in the
executi6n of legal. process, is a high offence against .the United
States, for which the perpeirator is liable to punishment, and the
same act may be also a gross breach of the peace of the state, a
riot, assault, or murder, and subject the same person to punishment under the state laws for misdemeanor or felony. That
either or both may, if they see fit, punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred, that the offender
has been twice punished for the same offence, but only that, by
one act, he h~s committed two offences, for each of which .he is
justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment b one
in bar to a conviction by the other. Consequently this court has
decided, in Fox v. The State of Ohio, that a state may. punish
the offence of uttering or passing false coin, as a cheat or fraud
practised on its citizens, and ifi the case of The United States
v. Marigold, that Congress, in the proper exercise of its authority, majr punish the same act as an offence against the United
States."
This case was decided in 1852, since which time the question
does not appear to have been raised in the Supreme Court.
In, the case of The United States v. Amy, a slave prosecuted for
the offence of robbing the mail, and tried in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, before
Chief Justice TANEY and Judge HALYBURTON, at May Term 1859,
the Chief Justice laid down the same principle in very strong
terms as the clear and settled law. He said: "In maintaining
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the power of the United States to pass this law [punishing a
slave with imprisonment for robbing the mail], it is, however,
proper to say, that as these letters, with the money in them, were
stolen in Virginia, the party might undoubtedly have been punished in the state tribunals, according to the laws of the state,
without any reference to the post-office or the Act of Congress,
because, from the nature of our government, the same act may
be an offence against the laws of the United States and also of a
state, and be punished in both. This was considered and decided
in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Fox v.
State of Ohio, and in the case of United States v. Marigold,
and the punishment in one sovereignty is no bar to his punishment in the other.
"Yet in all civilized countries it is recognised as a fundamental
principle of justice that a man ought not to be punished twice for
the same offence: And if this party had been punished for the
larceny in the state tribunal, the court would have felt it to be its
du.y to suspend sentence, and to represent the facts to the President, to give him an opportunity of ordering a nolle prosequi
or granting b pardon :" Richmond Law Jur. pp. 201, 202.
- These principles must be regarded. as the settled doctrine of
the Supreme Court. They ought to set at rest the disputed
questions to which they apply. They appear to me to be reasonable and just. But if I thought otherwise, I should feel' no
hesitation in yielding to the decisions of the Supreme Court, on
a question of this character, as authority binding upon me. They
are in donformity with the decision of the General Court of Virginia in Hen'drick's Case, 5 Leigh Rep. 707. That was a pro-.
secution for passing a forged check, purporting to be a check of
the cashier of the Bank of the United States. In delivering the
opinion of the court, .Judge DANIEL said: "It wis urged by the
prisoner's counsel that the judgment ought to have been arrested,
on the ground that the courts of Virginia ought not to punish
criminally any forgery of the notes, bills, br checks of or upon
the Bank of the Uniteid States, because this is an offence punish,
able by the courts of the United States, and if a state court,
which cannot oust the-courts of the United States- of tbeii jurisdiction, should proceed, it might so happen that a man might be
punished twice for the same offence.
The answer to this is.
that the law-of Virginia punishes the forgery not because it is an
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offence against the United States, but because it is an offence
against this Commonwealth, committed within its limits, and the
punishment of it is designed for the protection of our own citizens."
The Act or Congress by which the forging of checks, &c., of
the Bank of the United States was made punishable as an offence
against the United States, contained a provision to the effect, that
nothing therein should prevent the courts of the several states from
taking cognisance of the same act as offences under state laws.
But that proviso did not, as is conceded on all hands, confer jurisdiction upon the state courts, and is immaterial, therefore, to the
purpose for which I now- cite this case. The only effect claimed
fot such a proviso; as we shall see hereafter, is, that it relinquishes
as to the particular class of offences, the exclusive jurisdiction of
the 'courts of the United Statesq, under the provisions of the
Judiciary Act, and allows the courts of the states to exercise a
jurisdiction which, they might have exercised, if not prohibited by
the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the -courts of the United
States by the Judiciary Act.
This case, therefore, and every other which holds that a prosecution may be maintained in a state court under a state law, for
the offence of counterfeiting the coin, or for passing counterfeit
coin, or for any other offence against the coin provided for by Act
of Congress, or for the offence of forging a note or check of the
Bank of the United States, or of passing such forged note or check,
is an*authority for the proposition which I have been maintaining,'
that there is no incompatibility or repugnance between the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States fo punish a man for a
particular act as an offence against the United States, uder an
Act of Congress, and the jurisdiction of tlhe courts of a state to
punish the same man for the same act as an offence against the
state, under the laws of the state. The cases .ofthis sort are
numerous, and many of them are cited in a former part of this
opinion.
I do not see how the allowance of such a concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts, can lead to any collision between them
and the Federal courts, unless it should arise from a disregard of
the rule of comity which prevails between concurrent jurisdictions,
that the one which first takes cognisance of a subject-matter shall
be allowed to proceed without interference by the other: Taylor
v. GJarryl, 20 Howard Rep. 583 ; Freeman v. Howe et al., 24
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Howard Rep. 450. Such a concurrent jurisdiction has long been
exercised in respect to certain classes of criminal acts, and I am
not aware that it has led to any such collision. We must suppose
that the Federal and state authorities will be exercised in good
faith without jealousy, and with a view to the general good.
So exercised there need be no sort of conflict between them. But
if there should be more ground than I think really exists, to
apprehend such a collision, it would only present an instance of
thos6 " occasional interferences" spoken of in the Federalist,
which afford no ground, in the absenc.e of absolute incompatibility
and repugnance, for ousting the states of an authority which they
exercised before the formation of the Constitution: Federalist,
No. 32.
I do not think there is any solid ground for the objection that
this doctrine would, in its practical working, lead to injustice and
oppression, by subjecting offenders to double punishment for the
same act. We must suppose that the criminal laws will be administered as they should be in a spirit of justice and benignity to
the citizen, and that those who are intrusted with their execution
will interpose to protect offenders against double punishment,
whenever their interposition is necessary to prevent injustice or
oppression, and that if they should fail to do so,- the wrong will
be redressed by the pardoning power. We may safely assume
that there will be no cases of double punishment hereafter, as I
presume there have been none heretofore, except' perhaps in
cases of great enormity, or in cases attended by soihe peculiar
circumstances, in which the ends of justice could not be otherwise
secured.
It is said that the security thus afforded to the liberty of the
citizen is altogether too precarious- But it is not more so than
in any other case where no absolute rule has been prescribed,
which is to govern in all cases.- Whenever a power is .bestowed
which may be exercised or not exercised, according to the discretion of the court' or where the manner or .extent of its exercise
depends on the discretion of the court, injustice'may be done by
an abuse of the discretion and it may not be possible to preveidt
or to correct it. The law in every such case confides, of-necessity,
in the integrity and justice of the courts.
It must be remembered, however, that these objections to the
practical consequences of allowing such a concurrent jurisdiction
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to the state courts, if well founded, do -not afford a conclusive
argument against the existence of the jurisdiction. They could,
at most, only turn the scale if the argument on other grounds left
the question in doubt.
I conclu4-, therefore, that there is nothing in the relation be.
tween the st.ite and Federal governments, or in the nature of the
jurisdiction itself, which makes the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States to punish the act of passing a forged note of
a national bank, as an offence against the United States, necessarily exclusive. o the jurisdiction of the state courts to punish the
same act as an offence against the state. It remains to consider
whether it has been made so by Act of Congress.
A;s I have said 1before, the offence in this case belongs to a class
over which the states and their courts exercised jurisdiction before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. How far it is
competent for Congress to prohibit the state courts from exercising
jurisdiction, under state laws, over any such class of criminal
acts, by giving exclusive cognisance of them to the courts of the
United States,. has not been determined by the Supreme Court,
and it fs not necessary.for me to express an opinion on the question. This question was not in the mind of-the court when it was
said, in Martin v. Hunter, Lessee, 1 Wh. Rep. 304 (337), and in
The Moses Taylor, 4 Wallace Rep. 411, "-that the juMcial power
of the United States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all
stateauthority, and in all others may be made so at the election
of Congress." This is-evident from the context of this passage
in the former case. The court had just adverted, with approbation, to an argument which had been urgea, that it is imperative
on cc Congress to vest all the judicial power of the United States in
the shape of original jurisdiction in the 6upreme and idferior
And immediately after
courts created under its own authority."
the passage above quoted, and showing its meaning, are the following passages: "No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States can, consistently with the Constitution, be del6gated
to state tribunals. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is of
the same exclusive cognisance; and it can only be in those cases
where, previous to the Constitution, state tribunals p6ssessed juris.
Jiction independent of national authority, that they can now constitutionally.exercise a concurrent jurisdiction. Congress, throughout the Judiciary Act, and particularly in the 9th, 11th, and 18th
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sections, has legislated upon the supposition that in all cases to
which the judicial power of the United States extended, they
might rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction in'their own courts."
The opinion of Mr. Justice WASHINGTON in -ouston v. Moore,
5 Wheat. Rep. 1, is relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error, to sustain the propositioii that Congress may thus exclude
the .jurisdiction of the state courts under state laws, and that it
did so by the provision of the Judiciary Act giving to the courts
of the United States exclusive cognisance of all crimes and
offences cognisable under authority of the United States, unless
Qtherwise provided by that act or by some other Act of Congress,
so that the express consent of Congress was necessary to enable
the state courts to exercise jurisdiction under state laws over acts
declared by Congress to be offences against the United States.
It does not appear to what extent the views in question received
the concurrence of the other judges, one of whom declared in his
opinion that the views of the judges composing the majority,
coincided in but one thing, namely, that there was no error in
the judgment appealed from, and that no point whatever was
decided, except that the fine was constitutionally imposed upon
the plaintiff in error. Per JOHNSON, J., p. 47. .
. The single opinion of this eminent judge, however, is entitled
to great weight, and deserves further consideration. It must be
observed that Mr. Justice WASHINGTON regarded the case then
before him as involving the jurisdiction of the state courts to
" enforce the laws of Congress," as he said in one place, or, as
he said in another place, to "adjudicate in a case which depends
on a law of Congress and to enforce it." The casebefore us,',on
the other hind, involves the question whether the state.courts "can
take jurisdiction' bf an offence against the state created by a
statute of the state.
Houston, in that case, had been tried by a coifrt-martial of the
state of Pennsylvania, under an act of that state passed in 1814,
providing that officers and privates of. the militia neglecting or
refusing to serve when called into actual service in pursuance of
an order or requisition of the President of the United Statep,
shall be liable to the penalties defined in the Act of 6ngress
passed February 28th 1795, or to any penalty which may have
been prescribed since the date of that act, or to afiy. which might
be thereafter prescribed by any law of the United. States, and
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providing for the trial of such delinquents by a state court-martial, &c. The. learned judge, after stating the. character of the
case in the general terms above quoted, says, that "the offence to
be punished grows out of the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and is, therefore, clearly a case which might have been
withdrawn from the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tribunals."
Proceeding to consider the question whether, as Congress has not
given exclusive jurisaiction to courts-martial deriving their authority froih the United States, the courts-martial of the state can
exercise jurisdiction, the learned judge refers to the doctrine of
the Federalist, that Congress "may commit the decision of causes
arising upon a particular regulation to the Federal courts only,
yet that in any case in which the state tribunals should not be
expressly excluded by the acts of the National Legislature, they
would, of course, take cognisance of the causes to which these
acts might give birth." The judge says that he perceives no
objection to this doctrine, so long as the power of Congress to
withdraw the w.hole or any part of those cases from the jurisdiction of- the state courts, is, as he thinks it must be, admitted.
This part of the opinion has no reference to prosecutions in the
state courts for offences against the state under state laws. It has
reference to cases arising under Acts of Congress, and affirms the
right of the state courts to take cognisance of them, unless .the
jurisdiction of- the courts of the United States is made exclusive.
This is sufficienly obvious from the language of the judge. But
it will appear perhaps even more clearly from the 82d number of
the Federalist, to which the judge refers. -.
The learned judge then refers to the practice of the general
government as confirming this doctrine. He cites the Judiciary
Act as showing the opinion of Congress, that a mere grant of
jurisdiction generally to the courts of the United.States, was not
sufficient to vest the exclusive jurisdiction. He then proceeds as
follows: "In particular this law grants exclusive jurisdiction to
the Circuit Courts of all crimes and offences cognisable under the
authority of the United States, except where the laws of the
United States should otherwise provide ; and this will account for
the proviso in the Act of the 24th of February 1807, ch. 75,
concerning the forgery of the notes of the Bank of the United
States, that nothing in that act contained should be construed to
-deprive the courts of the individual states of jurisdiction, under
VOL. XVI.-18
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the laws of the several states, over offences made punishable by
that act. A similar proviso is to be found in the Act of the 21st
of April 1806, ch. 49, concerning the counterfeiting of the current coin of the United States. It is clear that, in the opinion
of Congress, this saving was necessary in order to authorize the
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the state courts over those
offences, and there can be very little doubt but that this opiniorn
was well founded. The Judiciary Act had vested in the Federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction of all offences. cognisable under the
authority of the United States, unless where the laws of the
United States should otherwise direct. The states could not,
therefore, exercise a concurrent jurisdiction in those cases, without coming into direct conflict with the Act of Congress. But by
these savings Congress did provide that the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts in the specified cases should not be exclusive, and
the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts was instantly restored. so far as, under state authority, it could be exercised by
them.". With deference to the authority of this -eminent judge,
-I submit that this reasoning is not satisfactory.
The object of the Judiciary Act was to, establish the judiciiry
system of the United States, and to regulate the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, as far as this was not done by the
Constitution. In respect. to crimes, the object was to regulate the
jurisdiction of those courts over such crimes as could be prosecuted and punished under the authority of the United, States It
was thought by many, and doubtless by the framers of that act,
though it has since been settled otherwise, that the courts of the
United States might take cognisance of offences at common law,
without the authority of an Act of Congress, and hence it was, I
apprehend, that they used the general expression, " Cognisable
under the authority of the United States." But the courts of
the United States could not take cognisance of any offence that
was not a violation of some law of the United States, whether
common law or statute, and it was of such violations of the'laws
of the United States-that exclusive cognisance was given to .the
Circuit Courts, unless otlierwise provided by law. If so other
wise provided, the jurisdictidn of the Circuit Courts, thus declared
to be exclusive, might be exercised equally by the courts of the
states. It wac long a subject of controversy and doubt whether
Congress might not thus confer jurisdiction upon the courts of the
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states to enforce the laws of the United States : see Jacksoi&v.
Rose, 2 Va. Cases 34; 1 Kent Com. 401-405. But what has this
to do with the jurisdiction of the state courts to punish offences
against state laws, even though the offences consist in acts declared
by Congress to be offences' against the .United States ? The object
of this Act of Congress had no reference to offences against the
laws of the states, which were the concern of the states and not
of the United States, and could not be made cognisable by the
courts of the United States. It was no part of the object of that
act to regulate the jurisdiction of sta.te Courts under state laws,
which belonged to theL state legislature and not to Congress, and
the. act makes no reference to state courts, except to say when
they may, and when they may not, exercise the same jurisdiction
that is vested in the courts of the United States.
It is obvious that the learned judge construed the terms
and oiTences," in the 11th section of the Judiciary Act,
as signifying the acts by tire doing of which crimes and offences
are committed. In this way he reaches the conclusion that the
Act of. Congress vests in the courts of the United States exclusive cognisance of those acts, and I apprehend it could be
reached in no other way. But this is not the proper sense of
these words. A crime or offence is the transgression of a law,
and the same act may constitute several offences. We have seen
that the same. act may be an offence against the United States,
and dt the same time, a.n offence against the state. So the same
act may constitute several offences against the laws of the state,
of which numerous illustrations are collected in 2 Leading Criminal Cases 555. The terms " crimes and offences," therefore, do
not properly signify the acts by which the laws are violated, but
they signify the violations of law which those acts produce. And
I see no reason for supposing that they were not used: in this
sense in the Judiciary Act. Congress could give, and intended
to give, to the courts of the United States cognisance of criminal
acts only so far as they constitute violations of the laws of the
United States. So far as they violate the laws of the states, it
was not in the power of Congress to confer the cognisance of
them upon the Federal courts.
The learned judge did not fail to see that an act done by a
party may violate an Act of Congress and so be an offence
a-gainst the United States, and, at the same time, violate a law
C7crimes
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of the state and so be an offence against the state.
But
he did not clearly distinguish between the act and the offence.
Hence he says, in a subsequent part of the opinion, that
where Congress allows the state courts to punish, under state
laws, the same acts that are made offences against the United
States, the sentence of conviction or acquittal in either court
(state or Federal) may be pleaded in bar of a prosecution before
the other. And so he thinks that when Congress has vested in
the courts of the United States exclusive cognisance of crimes and
offences against the United States, the courts of the states cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the same acts, under state laws, as an
offence against the state, without coming into conflict with .the Act
of Congress. But we have seen that there is no incompatibility
or conflict between such an exercise of jurisdiction by state courts,
under state laws, and by the courts of the United States, under
Acts of Congress.
I think these observations are sufficient to show that the views
of Mr. Justice WASHINGTON are not well founded, and that the
Act of 1789 does not exclude the state courts from taking jurisdiction of an offence against the state, under a state law, com.
nitted by the same act which constitutes an offence against the
United States under an Act of Congress. It follows that such a
saving proviso as we have been considering is not necessary to
enable the courts of the states to exercise their jurisdiction in the
cases alluded to.
This conclusion is fully sustained by the cas~s of Fox v. State
of Ohio, Moore v. Peojle of Illinois, United States v..Amy, and
Hendrick's.Uase,before cited. In the first and last of these cases
the Acts of Congress contained provisos to save the jirisdiction
of state courts under state laws. But the existence of the provisos was not noticed, and the cases were decided on the ground
of a separate and independent authority in the states to punish
offences against their own laws. In the other two cases the Acts
of Congress contained no such savings, and yet the state courts
,were held to have jurisdiction under state laws. See also Stat
Iv. Tutt 2 Bailey's S. C. Rep. 44.
I see no reason to believe that Congress really intended. by the
Act of 1864 to exclude the jurisdiction of state. courts, undei
state laws, to punish the circulation of forged notes of national
banks. The act exhibits no jealousy or distrust of. the state courts
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On the contrary, that act amended the Act of 1863, so as to give
to the state courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal courts,
of the important suits and proceedings which may, under that
act, be instituted against national banks, the jurisdiction of which
was, by the Act of 1863, confined to the Federal courts. And
I presume that no good reason can be suggested why a state court
should be allowed to punish, under a law of the state, a cheat
effected by means of a counterfeit coin, and not be allowed to
punish, under a law of the state, a cheat effected by means of a
forged national bank note.
Upon the whole, I think that the objection of a want of jurisdiction in the court was properly overruled. I think also, that
there is no foundation forthe other errors assigned- imr the petition,
and that the judgment should be affirmed.
MoNcuE, President, concurred.
RrvEs, J., dissented.
Judgmeit affirmed:.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE PITTSBURGH & CONNELLSVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY v.
1WILLIAM A. M'CLURG.
It is negligence for a passenger on a railroad train to put his arm out of the cai
window, and if the facts are undisputed that the injury resulted from this cause,
the Court should pronounce it negligence as a matter of law.
There may be qualifying circumstances in the condition of the passenger whichwould make special care the duty of the carrier, but such facts should be proved as
part of the case. Per THOMPsoN, C. J.
The case of the New merse
Railroad Co. v. .Kennard, 9 Hartis 203, so far as it
decided that it is the duty of railroadocompanies to place guards on their car windows so as to prevent passengers from putting their limbs out, overruled.

ERROR to District Court of Allegheny county.
Shiras, for plaintiff in error.
Lowrie J6 Marshall, for defendant.
- The opinion of the court was delivered at Philadelphia, January
7th 1868, by
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TnoMPso2, 0. J.-The plaintiff below, as we learn from the
very brief history of the case by the plaintiff in error, no portion
of the testimony being given, was injured while a passenger in the
cars of defendant, by reason of the protrusion of his elbow beyond
the sill of the car window, next to which he sat during the journey, or part of it, and thus coming in contact with a car standing
on a switch on the defendants' road. The plaintiff had a verdict
on the ground of negligence on part of the company, as we are
informed, in carrying the plaintiff, by reason of which he was
hurt, but in what the negligence consisted it is not easy to say,
as neither the nar.nor its substance is given. Was it for negligence in constructing the switch ? Or was it because the defendant bad not barricaded its car windows ? We do not know ; but
still, perhaps, we may be able to discuss the only point of import.
ance presented, without knowing this.
Assuming the fact, or claiming that negligence on part of the
company in performing their duty towards the plaintiff in carrying him had been proved, his counsel prayed the court below to
charge as follows :"A passenger on a railway car who has unconsciously suffered
his elbow to slip beyond the window sill is not necessarily guilty
of negligence: N. J. Railroad Co. v. Kennard, 9 Harris 203."
This the learned judge unqualifiedly affirmed, doubtless on the
authority of the case referred to in the point. ' He did right in
following the precedent cited, even if wrong; he was bound to do
so. If, therefore, there was error in the instruction it was not
his fault.
That unconsciousness, arising from insensibility, the result of
disease or injury','might qualify what would otherwise be negligence, may be conceded, but that would arise from the difference
in the degree of care required on the part of the carrier. If a
passenger were known to be afflicted with epileptic fits, or was
entirely insane, it would be reasonable to require of the carrier
more care and attention than in the case of ordinary passengers;
but then the carrier *must know the condition of the passenger,
and that extra care and: control were necessary, and his duty.
This, however, we need not discuss, for nothing.like this existed
in this case. We must regard the remark, "unconsciously suffering his elbow to slip.out beyond the window sill," to mean inattentively. In that sense it was negligently suffered to slip. Of
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-ourse, this was negligence in se, unless he was under no obligation to take care of himself. But no case asserts that, and every
ease the contrary. Out of the omission to do so springs the
doctrine of contributory negligence which defeats a plaintiff, and
which is so firmly established as a principle of law that nobody
dreams of doubting it. We have the case then broadly, I think,
that negligence is not to be inferred when injury accrues from an
exposure of an elboi' or an arm out of a car window, while the
train is moving, if it be not wilfully done.
This cannot be maintained on any reasonable principle, we
think. When a passenger on a railroad purchases his ticket it
entitles him to a, seat in the cars. In the seat, no part of his body
is exposed to obstacles outside of the car. He ia secure there,
ordinarily, from any contact with them. Where he is thus provided with a seat, safe and secure in the absence of accident to
the train, and the carrier has a safe and convenient car, well conducted and skilfully managed, his duty is p~erformed towards the
passenger. The duty of the latter on entering arises, namely,
that he will conform to all the reasonable rules and regulations
of the- company for occupyimg, using, and leaving the cars; and,
after doing so, if injury befall him hy the negligence of the
carriers, they must answer; if he do not so conform, but is guilty
of negligence therein, and if injured, although there may be
negligence orf part of the carriers, their servants and agents, he
cannot recover: Sullivan v. Beading Railroad Go., 6 Casey
234' Penna. Railroad Co. v. Zebe and Wife, 9 Id. 18, and
other authorities. In the latter case we said what is quite apposite in this: "We hold on these principles that the company's
liability could not be fixed for the injury donsequent on a choice
of the passenger in disregard of the provisions made by it for his
safety. It was, we think, error in the court to submit the question of the right of the parties to leave the cars at either side, to
the jury, in the absence of proof or justifying necessity lor so
doing. It was not negligence on part of the company that they
did not by force of barriers prevent the parties from leaving at
the wrong side. People are not to be treated as cattle ; they are
to be presumed to act reasonably in all given contingencies, and
the company had no reason to expect anything else in this case."
Here the duty of care on the part of the passenger is asserted ;
and it was a case in which two passengers, the plaintiff and son,
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instead of leaving the cars by the platform at the station, left on
the opposite side, and the son was killed by a passing train on the
other track. We held that this was negligence in se on part of
the passengers, and in the absence of circumstances justifying the
exit on that side of the car, the court erred in not charging that
it was negligence in law. The authority of this case has not been
shaken in this particular. We have repeatedly held that it is the
duty of courts in cases of clear negligence arising from an obvios
disregard of duty and safety, to determifie it as a question of law:
Catawissa Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 2 P. F. Smith 282;
Penna.Railroad Co. v. . Ogier, 11 Casey 71 ; Penna. Railroad
Co. v. Zebe, 9 Id. 318.. Numerous other authorities might be
cited for this. Where the inference from the facts is necessarily
that there is negligence, the court ought to determine the negligence as a matter of law. Of course the assertion" of the principle in this w~y presupposes no answer to the facts, so as to rebut
the inference to be drawn, and implies that this may be done in
all cases, if there be facts to that effect.
A passenger, ofl entering a railroad car, is to be presumed to
know the use of a seat, and the use of a window ;.that the former
is to sit in, and the latter is to admit light and air. Each has its
separate use. The seat he may occupy in any way most comfortable to himself. The window he has a right to enjoy-but not to
occupy. Its use is for the benefit of all, not for'the comfort alone
of him who has by accident got nearest to it. If, therefore, he
sit with his elbow in it, he does so without authority, and if he
allows it to protrude out of it and is injured, is this due care.on
his part ? He was not put there by the carrier, nor invited to go
there ; nor misled in regard to the fact that it is not part of his
seat, nor that its purposes were not exclusively to admit light and
air for the benefit of all. His position is, therefore, without
authority. His negligence consists in putting his limbs where
they ought not to be, and liable to be broken without his ability
to know whether there is danger or not approac-hing. In a case,
therefore, where the injury stands confessed, or is proved to have
resulted from the position voluntarily or thoughtlessly taken, in
a window, by contact with outside obstacles or forces, it cannot
be otherwise characterized than as negligence, and so to be pro.
nounced by the court. This is undoubtedly the rule in Massachusetts: Todd v. The Old Colony Railroad Co., 8 Allen 18;
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and again in same case, 7 Allen 207. In that case the point was
distinctly presented whether it was negligence to ride with an
arm or an elbow out of a car window, and it was declared that it
should have been so ruled by the court instead of being referred
to the jury ; and the court below was 'reversed for not so ruling.See opinion of C. J. BIGELOW in the last case. So in substance
is Holbrook v. The Utica & Sch. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. 226.
It is true, the judge below having given a very decided opinion
on the fact of negligence, sitting with an elbow on the window,
and that it was negligence, the Court of Errors and Appeals refused
to interfere ; but RUGGLES, J., indicated his opinion to be in favor
of the doctrine. We held in the "North Penna. Railroad Co. v.
Hleilman, 13 Wright 60, that a failure of a traveller when crossing a railroad track, to look out for passing trains, is negligence
in law, and so to be pronounced. This was fully in accord with
what we had repeatedly held, that what "in a given state of facts
constitutes negligence, is generally a question of law," per
WOODWARD, 0. J., in Catawissa Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 2
P. F. -Smith 286; and in .Penna. Railroad Uo. v. Ogier, 11
Casey 71, we said there may.undoubtedly be cases in which theonly facts proved may present so clearly and incontestably features of negligence in regard to the specific ground of complaint,
that it may become the duty of the courts to pronounce it such as
matter of law." There are many cases in other states in support.
of this rule.
In the absence of some justifying iecessity, or incapacity to
take care of himself on part of the passengYer, no one can doubt,
I think, from the reason of the thing, in view of the nature of the
vehicle used, being a railroad car, that td extend an arm or a
hand beyond the window sill is dangerous, and is recklessness or
negligence. Wherever the facts present such a case singly, and
without any controlling or justifying necessity, we think the court
ought to declare the act negligence ; and as there was frothing
like this shown in the case before us, we think the court ought
not to have affirmed plaintiff's point. Unconsciously exposing
himself did not help the plaintiff's case, as it was not shown that
this unconsciousness was not the result of a want of prudent
attention to his situation on part of the plaintiff. It would be a
novel answer to the allegation of negligence, to allege that the
plaintiff slept in such a position as he was in when hurt, and that
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would be a condition of unconsciousness. Sleeping where due
care would require one to be awake, or in dangerous circumstances, is negligence, and no answer 'to the company can be
given to the act. Of course these views are predicated of a case
in which there are no facts to. qualify or justify the act. It is
possible that a state of facts might be found to show an exception
to the rule, and where that occurs the rule ceases. But none
such appears as this case is presented.
It must be admitted that the case of New Jerseyq Railroad Co.
v. Kinnard, 9 Harris 203, announces a different rule. There
the plaintiff's elbow came in contact with a post or upright of a
bridge. The case was not put upon the ground that there was
negligence on the part of the company in constructing the bridge,
but upon the ground that the company were negligent in not
placing barriers around the window to prevent passengers from
exposing their limbs outside. The learned judge (GIBsoN, J.)
instructed the jury that a car which was not so provided
was not, to'use his peculiar expression, "roadworthy."
Predicated of this idea, he held that passengers had a right to ride as
they pleased, and to sit with their elbows on the window sills,
and beyond it, if they chose. In fact, he seems to have required
no duty of care on part of the passenger in this particular; for,
had he, it seems to me he would, even on his own theory of the
duty of the company in barricading their windows, have come
to the conclusion if the want of it was negligence, it was dlso
negligence on part of. the passenger not to take greater care on
account of the want of the precaution, and that would have been
contributory negligence, which would have prevented the plaintiff from recovering.
The case was affirmed in a per curiam opinion, for the reasons
given by the learned judge below, but with 4 reservation of
approval of that which was really the ground on which the case
was put. "The language of the learned judge who presided at
the trial, seems to be too broad as a general principle, where he
says that no car is good if the windows are not so constructed as
to prevent the passengers from putting their limbs through therh.
But in its application to a road, which, in places, is so narrow as
to endanger projecting limbs, the instruction is proper." It is
not unjust to this per curiam to say that .it repudiated the main
ground on which the case was put in the court below, and affirmed
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it or a principle not in the case at all, namely, the narrowness 'of
the passage-way under the bridge. The bridge was not built by
the railroad company ; as it was over a canal, it was probably
built by the canal company. The passage-way was wide enough
for the cars to pass conveniently, but that is nothing to the pur.
pose ; the narrowness of the passage-way was not the ground of
the recovery. The report of the case says the " whole question
was whether the defendants were obliged to construct their cars
-with slats, bars,.wire gauze, or other barricades, so that a passenger could not put his arms out of the windows. If the
defendants did not do so,.whether they are liable." It is evident
the- -case was very little considered, and, in the presence of
authorities cited, ought not now to be regarded as the law. It
is very remarkable that it should have been said in the opinion
that the doctrine of -barricades about the car-windows was too
broad, as a general principle, but just in its application where
the passage-way was so narrow as-to endanger projecting limbs.
This was a limitation of the principle impracticable in practice.
The windows would necessarily be the same on the entire road,
if made to suit any peculiar portion of it. lIa this again is shown
that it was not a case which fiad been considered much.
In conclusion, we have simply to reassert that where a traveller puts his elbow or an arm out of a car-window, voluntarily,
without any qualifying circumstances impelling him to it, it must
be regarded as negligence in se; and when that is the state of.
the evidence, it is the duty of the court" to declare the act negligence in law.
We think the court; erred in answering the plaintiff's point in
the affirmative, and the defendant's in the negative, and for these
reasons the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.

District Court of the United States.
Kew York.

Southern --District of

IN THE MATTER OF JAMES D. RAY, A BANKRUPT.
A creditor who has proved his debt has a right to examine a bankrupt under
section 26 of the act, although his debt may appear to be barred by the Statute
of Limitations of the state in which the proceedings are instituted.
A debt barred by the Statute of Limitations is not "1due and payable" so as to be
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provable in bankruptcy, but as there is no limitation in the Bankruptcy Act whose
operation is coextensive with the limits of the United States, no claim can be held
barred unless it be shown that it is not recoverable in any part of the United States.
UPON the day appointed by the register on the application of
Wheeler, Madden & Clemsen, creditors, for the examination of
the bankrupt and his wife, and other witnesses, under section 2G
of the Bankruptcy Act, the bankrupt objected to the examination
on the ground that the claim of these creditors was barred by the
Statute of Limitations of the state of New York, and in support of such objection, the bankrupt put in before the register an
affidavit and plea for the purpose of availing himself of the plea
and defence of such statute. The facts were conceded by the
creditors to be correctly set forth in the affidavit. The affidavit
made by the bankrupt stated that the claim of the creditors was
filed with the assignee December 7th 1867, the assignee having
been appointed September 12th 1867 ; that such claim was founded
upon a. note made by the bankrupt and another person, as copartners, dated at New York, May 1st 1860, for $747.14, payable
in eight months after date, and upon a balance of account against
said copartnership, amounting to $1197.38, for merchandise purchased by if from said creditors prior to October -1860; that the
debtors and the creditors all of them resided within the state of
New York at the time such indebtedness arose or was contracted,
and have- thence continued and now are residents within said
state ; that the credit on said indebtedness expired, and 'the
entire claim became due and payable, and so remained for more
than six years before the filing of the original petition of the
bankrupt herein ;. that any right or cauge of action accruing
thereon against said copartnership or said bankrupt, did not
accrue within six years next before the filing of said petition;
that by reason thereof the said claim is barred by the Statute of
Limitations of the state of New York; that the said note was
made and delivered at New York, and was payable there, and
the said merchandise was purchased there, and the claim of said
creditors was contracted there ; the bankiupt takes objection to
all proceedings by said creditors, or on their behalf, in this watter, and makes the affidavit, and interposes the plea of said statute, for the purpose of availing himself of said objection, and of
said statute, as a defence and bar to said claim, or lo its allowance as a claim against his estate, and as a bar to- the right of
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said creditors to have such examination; and that the bankrupt
has in no way or manner waived such objection.
On the foregoing facts, and on the request of the parties, the
register cert;fied to the District Judge for his opinion thereon the
following question: "Has a creditor.who has proved his debt,
but whose debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations of the
state of New York, as set forth in said affidavit and plea, a right
to examine the bankrupt under section 26 of the Bankruptcy
Act?"
BLATCHFORD,

.- At the request of the parties, made through

the register, the court consented to receive written briefs on the
question- A brief has been furnished on the part of the bankrupt, but none on the part of the creditors. The questions discussed on the pa'rt, of the bankrupt are, whether the bankrupt is
stopped of availing himself of the Statute of Limitations by reason
of his having set forth the claim of the creditors in the schedule
of creditors annexed to his petition ; whether the bar created by
the statute of New York cannot operate as a complete bar to the
debt, unless it be also shown that the debt would be barred in all
the states of the Union ; and whether this being a proceeding
for the relief of the debtor, and the discharge he petitions for
being a matter of concession and favor, he" cannot interpose a
technical defence or ohjection, or one that does not go to the e'quities between the parties. It is argued on the part of the bankrupt that the placing by him of the debt upon his- schedule to the
petition, is not a promise to pay the debt, or an admission of a
willingness to pay it, or an admission that itis due, or an acknowledgment or recognition of its existence, or of an existing liability to pay it-,
from which a new promise may be inferred ; the
fact that the debt is named, is a proceeding; the sole purpose of
which is to obtain a discharge from all liability in the debt, being
a circumstance calculated to repel the presumption of an intent
or promise to pay the debt; that under the facts in regard to this
debt, the creditors cannot claim the benefit of the Statute of
Limitations of any other state than New York; and that the
right to a discharge, in complying with the law, is a legal right.
The question certified is treated by the argument on the part
of the bankrupt as identical, whether the claim in this case is prov.
able under the Bankruptcy Act or not.

-
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The 26th section provides that the court may, on the applica
tion of " any creditor," require the bankrupt to submit to at.
examination upon, among other things, -all debts claimed from,
him, and all matters concerning his property and estate. The
22d section provides that the court may, on the application of
" any creditor," examine upon oath the bankrupt or any person
tendbring, or who has made proof of claims, and may summon
any person capable of giving evidence concerning such proof, or
concerning the debt sought to be proved, and shall reject all
claims not duly proved, or where the proof shows the claim to be
founded in fraud, illegality, or mistake. Before a creditor can,
under section 26, apply for an order to examine the bankrupt, he
must prove his claim. The words "any creditor," in that section, mean, any creditor who has proved his claim. It is true
that the examination under that section may extend. to an examination concerning the claim itself.. But an examination of the
bankrupt, when aesired, in regard to a claim proved or sought tc
be proved, can take place under the 22d section ; and the worda
"any creditor," in the last clause of that section, must, from
the language of the whole section, be held to mean not only a
creditor who has proved his debt, but a creditor"who has tendfered proof of his debt which has not yet been allowed, so as to
authorize the latter as well as the former to apply for an examination under the 22d section. The order for the. examination in
the present case is stated to have been made under the 26th section, and must intend that it was not to be merely an examination
in reference to the debt claimed by those creditors.. As their
debt had been proved, they had a right under section 26 to apply
for the order. The debt being proved and the order being made,
the creditors have a right to proceed with the examination.
The 28d section requires the 6ourt to allow all debts duly
proved. But under the provision in the 22d section, before
quoted, the court is required to reject all claims not duly proved
or where the proof shows the claim to be founded in fraud, illegality, or mistake. The claim of these 6reditors must stand as
proved until it is rejected either as not having been duly prove&,
or as having been founded in illegality or mistake. If the bankrupt desires to have the claim rejected for any such reasons, he
must apply to the court by petition, and a reference will be
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ordered, under section 88, to take the examination provided for
by section 22.
I might content myself with answering the question certified,
by saying that a creditor who has proved his debt has a right to.
examine th- bankrupt under section .26 of the act, although his
debt may ai pear to be barred under the circumstances set forth
in this case. But what is really desired by the parties is a decision whether the debt in this case is one which ought to be
rejected as being barred by the Statute of Limitations of New
York. The Bankruptcy Act is silent as to the operation of any
statute of limitation. Tire 19th section provides that "1all debts
due and payable from the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication
of bankruptcy, may be proved -against his estate." This language is broad enough on its face to include all debts, no matter
of how long standing. I have not met with any decision under
any former Bankruptcy Act of the United States, on the question
presented; but in England it has always- been held, under the
Bankruptcy Law, that a debt which cannot be recovered in an
action, againsi a plea of the Statute of Limitations, cannot be
proved in bankruptcy" , Ex parte Doardney, 15 Vesey 479 ; Be
Clendening, 9 Irish Eq. R. N. S. 287. And in England a dividend paid on such a debt'was ordered to be repaid: Ex yarte
Dardney, u6i supra. The principle involved is that the debtor
is under no olligation to pay such a debt; and that, therefore, it
canldot be said to be "due and payable." The rule in Englandcontinues to be the same, and the ground on which. it- is put by
elementary writers is, that the bankrupt has no option as to
defending or not defending a claim against his estate in bankruptcy, save through the action of the assignee, and the assignee
is bound, in the interest of the body of creditors, to set up any
legal defence which the bankrupt could have set up if he were
not bankrupt: 1 Archbold's Law of Bankruptcy, by Griffith &
Holmes, ed. of 1867, 533; 2 Doria & Macrae's Laws and Practice of Bankruptcy 787.
I think that is the proper rule ; and that, under section 19 of
the Bankruptcy Act, no debt can be considered "due and payable" which is barred by limitation, and that a debt so barred
cannot be proved in bankruptcy.
Is the debt in the present case so barred ?
The Code of Procedure of New York provides (sections 74,-
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91) that-a civil action or causes of action such as those in this
case can only be commenced within six years after the causes of
action occurred; but that the objection that the action was not
commenced within the time limited can only be taken by answer.
The whole scope of the statute is one affecting the remedy merely,
and not the contract. A complaint setting out a cause of action
which appears to have -occurred more than six years before the
action was commenced, is not objectionable on the face, or open
to a demurrer. The defence of the limitation must be set up by
answer. If it is not so set up, it is waived. Now, the distinction between a law which affects the right and merits of a contract, and extinguishes it and makes it null and void, as the result
of a proscription or limitation, and a law which does no more
than limit the time within which an action must be brought upon
.the contract in thd courts of the country which enacts the law,.is
well settled. •A law of the latter description is wholly confined to
the country enacting it. A law of the former description may,
under certain circumstances, so affect the contract and its construction as to be capable of being invoked as a bar to an action
on it in another country : Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bingham's N. C.
202; Story's Confi. of Laws, § 182. The'Statuterof Limitations
of New York goes exclusively to the remedy in the courts of
New York, and could .never- be invoked as a bar to an action in
another state on the contract in question in this case. This principle is sought by the creditors in this case to be applied to their
claim ; and they insist that, as they would have a right, notwith.
standing anything foud in the law of New York, to sue the bankrupt on their claim, if they find 'him within the jurisdiction .of
another state, they. ought not to be deprived of the privilege of.
proving their claim in bankruptcy, under a law of the United
States, whose operation is co-extensive with the limits of the
United States, unless it is shown that the claim is barred through Dut the limits of the United States. The English Bankruptcy
Law'is co-extensive as to territorial operation with the English
Statute of Limitations.
The Bankruptcy Act of the United States operates in all -tLt
states as well as in New York. -Under these circumstances I
think that a debt to be barred by limitation, so ai not to be prov
able under the Bankruptcy Act, as not being due anid payable,"
must be shown to be so barred throughout the limits of the United
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States. I am the less reluctant to hold this view because.a contrary rule would have an effect which the counsel for the bankrupt in this case seem to have entirely overlooked. By section
32 of the Bankruptcy Act, a discharge under it discharges the
bankrupt from all debts and claims Which are by the act made
provable against his estate, except such as are excepted by
section 33 ; and by section 34 it is declared that the discharges
shall, with such exception, release the bankrupt "from all debts,
claims, liabilities, and demands which were or ought to have been
proved against his estate in bankruptcy."
If it be held in. this case that the debt cannot be proved against
the 'estate, it will fhot be discharged, and it will stand against the
bankrupt. If he shall hereafter be sued upon it in another state,
the discharge in bankruptcy will be no defence to, such suit, if it
appears that in. a direct adjudication the creditors were refused
permission by the Court in Bankruptcy to jrove their claim, on
the ground that it was barred by the Statute of Limitations of
New York, and that statute will be no defence to such suit. The
effect of applying in this case the views contended for on the part
of the bankrupt would be very disastrous to his interests.
The schedules to his petition disclose the names of 324 creditors,
whose aggregate debts, as set forth therein, amount to over
$120,000. Of these creditors, 235 are set down as. residing in
the state of New York. Of the entire amount of debts, some
$30,000 have been put into the shape of judgments. The rest
appear to have been (all of them) past due for more than six
years at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed, and to be
simple contract debts.
The same rule that would exclude the ffebt in. question here
from being provable, would exclude others , probably the debts
of all the 235 creditors who reside in New York-possibly the
debts of all the 324, except those in judgments. Thus, the bankrupt would by his discharge secure discharge from but a meagre
fraction of his debts. In the present case ten debts have been
proved, amounting in the aggregate (including the debt in question here, which is proved at $2897.29), to a little over $13,500.
These debts are all of them in the same category. They are
simple contract debts, not in judgment, and were all of them due
and payable more than six years before the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy in this case. If they should be held to be not
VOL. XVI.-19
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provable against the estate of the bankrupt, because they were
barred by the Statute of Limitations of the state of New York,
at the time such petition was filed, and yet should be held under
section 34 of the act to be discharged by a discharge in this
case, because they were in fact proved against the estate, and all
the other unproved simple contract debts should be held not to
be discharged, because they were not proved ; and because, having been due and payable for more than six years before the filing
of such petition, they were not provable, the results would be
that the debts in judgment, amounting to $80,000, and the debts
proved, amounting to $18,500, would be discharged, while the
remainder of the debts, amounting to nearly $80,000, would be
unaffected by the discharge.
This is certainly a result which the bankrupt cannot be supposed to be .aiming at by his proceedings in bankruptcy, or by
taking the objection that the debt in question here is not provable against his estate. And yet it is a result which must inevitably follow, if the views urged on his behalf are sound. I do
not think that any interpretation of the act ought to be admitted,
"which can "work out any such result if any other interpretation
*isfairly to be deduced from its proyisions. -It is not to be presumed that a beneficent statute like this, which was designed to
restore to the pursuits of trade and business (for the benefit of
the whole country), energies which have been crippled by"misfortune; is so hampered in its operation as not to extend to the
discharging of a simple-contract debt, which has been past due for
more than six years. The provision in section 19, that" all debts
due and payable from the bankrupt" may be proved, is broad
enough to include all debts, no matter how old, for the recovery
of which, but for a discharge under the act, the bankrupt can be
sued anywhere within the territory 'where the discharge will operate; and no provision is found in the act which destroys the
provability of a debt because it is barred by the Statute of Limitations of ane state.
These views dispose of the questions presented in the certifi.cake
from the Register, without the necessity of deciding on any of the
other points raised. But I ought to say that I am not 'satisfied
that the setting forth of a debt'in a schedule to a voluntary peti.
tion in bankruptcy can have the effect of'destroying a bar which
has come ihto operation in regard to a debt by virtue of the Sta.
Lute of Limitations.

IN THE M1ATTER OF JEWETT.

District Court of the United States. 2Vort1iern District of
Illinois. In Bankruptcy.
IN THE MATTER OF FREDERICK JEWETT, BANKRUPT.
Where there are both individual and partnership creditors of a bankrupt, but the
assets are individual only, though mainly consisting of goods purchased by the
bankrupt from the partnership on its dissolution prior to the bankruptcy, and being
principally the same goods in the purchase of wyhich the partnership dehtq had
originated; the partnership creditors will be entitled to be paid part pass with the
individual creditors.

TnE facts appear in the following certificate of the Register,
Hon. LrNcoLN CLAE.-This being the, day fixed for the second
meeting of cre.ditors, the assigne e, Mark Kimbell, Esq., made
his report by whic h it appeared that he had in his hands the
sum of thirty-seven thousand six hundred ind forty-six dollars
and eighty-three cents (837,646.83) cash as assets subject to
distribution, as the creditors or the assignee should determine
according to section 27 of the Act of Bankruptcy.
Upon due consideration and in view of what might be necessary
to meet. future expenses and provide for claims not yet proved,
&c., a majority of the creditors being present and declining to.
decide, the assignee, at their request, decided that twenty-five
per cent. of the cash in his hands should be distributed ,among
those creditors who had proved their claims and who Were legally
entitled to receive a dividend out of the assets of the bankrupt's
estate, and that the surplus should remain in his hands subject to
future distribution. The said Jewett was fdrced into bankruptcy
under the involuntary provisions of the act at the instance of The
Third National Bank of Chicago.
At the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy the said Jewett
was a hardware merchant in the city of Chicago, and previdus to
February 1st 1867, was in copartnership with one Oliver R.
Butler for the space of ten years, under the firm and style of
Jewett & Butler. On said 1st of February the said Jewett purchased the entire interest of Butler. The entire indebtedness
of the bankrupt was more than one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000). The whole amount of the assets, good and doubtful,
were estimated at between fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) and
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sixty thousand dollars ($60,000). About eighty-five thousand
dollars ($85,000) of claims were proved by the individual ore
ditors of Jewett, and about sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000)
were proved by the creditors of Jewett & Butler.
The Third National Bank, who instituted the proceeding, were
indiyidual and joint creditors.
Upon this state of the proofs Mr. Clarkson, attorney for some
of thE individual creditors, and also for some of the joint creditors, contended that the individual creditors and the joint ereditors- should be paid par passu out of the assets. Mr. Waller,
attorney in behalf of some of the individual creditors, contended
that the joint creditors could receive no portion of the assets of
the bankrupt until the claims of the individual creditors were
fully satisfied. There was no evidence of the solvenc' of Oliver
Butler, nor that there were any partnership assets; nor was there
any evidence to- the contrary, and thereupon the question arose
whethei- the joint creditors were entitled to share equally with the
individual creditors in the dividend of assets. The register overruied the objection made by Mr. Waller, and decided that all the
creditors were entitled to equal distribution, which question, by
the agreement of the respective attorneys, is certified to the court
for its decision.
In this case the bankrupt is as much bound to pay the debts
due and owing by Jewett & Butler as he is to *ay his own individual debts.
In fact the debts owing by the partnership are several as well
as joint ; and the creditors have a right to proceed igainst any
property or' interest therein which he has for the satisfaction" of
their claims; and if there is any pinciple in equity which qua lifies this rule it is not because the obligatioln of the bankrupt is
any less, nor because all his interests in his property are not subject to the payment of his debts ; but equity will interfere only
to protect the relative rights of others as those rights shall be
made to appear. It appears to me, then, thatprimdfacie all the
creditors of 'the bankrupt have the right to proceed against his
property for the satisfaction of their debts.
It is undoubtedly a rule in equity that where. there ar6 individual creditors and partnership creditors, and individual assets
and partnership assets, the individual creditors must resort to the
individual assets, and the joint creditors to the partnership assets ;
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and it is not denied that this rule is applicable in bankruptcy.
But how stands the rule when there are separate and joint creditors, but no joint or partnership assets, all the assets being those
of the bankrupt ? There are exceptions upon this subject: Story
on Part., § 378, says: "These exceptions allow a joint creditor
to share yari passu with the separate creditors in every case to
which they are applicable. They are of three sorts: (1.) When
the joint creditor ii the petitioner for a separate commission
against the bankrupt partner. (2.) Where there is no joint estate
"andno living solvent partner. (3.) Where there are no separate
debts." The rule their is that "where there is no joint estate
and no living solient partner."' the joint creditors shall share
equally with the separate creditors.
How then is the exception to be-manifested ? Under what circumstances shall it b considered that there is no joint estate-and
no- solvent living partner ?
If there was any joint estate the bankrupt was interested in it.
and he was bound to set it out in his schedule, but he has set forth
none. -No doubt it would have been competent for the individual
creditors to have proved that .there was a joint estate and a solvent living partner, but they did not seek to do it, but contended
that the individual debts should b& first paid although there was
no joint estate, and although the individual debts would consume
the whole amdunt of the assets.
Can it be that the joint creditors have no rights against the
assetq "until they allege and prove negative propositions ?
In equity where two parties have a lien. upon one fund, and
one of the parties has a lien also upon a second fund, the party
having a lien upon the first fund can compel the other party to
exhaust his remedy upon the second fund before he can resort to
the first.
But must he not allege and prove the existence of the second
fund ?
I suppose it is clear that he must.
How does the statement of facts and the proof in the foregoing
case differ?
There is a view of the subject which would render it exceedingly unjust that the joint creditors should be postponed to the
individual creditors.
The testimony of Jewett -was taken in his deposition. He
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proves, that, after he bought out the interest of his partner, ht
purchased but few goods; of course the debts of the joint creditors were made in the sale to the firm of Jewett & Butler of the
goods which constituted chiefly the assets of Jewett.
Should these goods be turned away from the payment of the
joint debts, which constituted the consideration for making them,
to the payment of the individual debts ?
"Equity alone can restrain the joint creditors from receiving
their full dividend until the joint effect's are exhausted." See
James on Bankruptcy 91.
I am of the opinion, in the present state of the
proofs, that the
joint creditors should be paid yari passu with the individual
creditors.
DRUMMOND, J.-As there seems to be no joint fund or source
of payment 'for.the joint creditors, I think the decision of the
Register is right.

.District Court of the United States. Northern District of
.llinois. In Bankruptcy.'
IN TILE MATTER OFFREDERICK JEWETT.
Where A., one of two partners, sells his interest in the concern to his copartner,
B., taking. his notes therefor, and B. bacomes bankrupt, leaving some of the notes
unpaid, A. cannot receive a dividend from the assignee until all the partnership
debts have been paid.
THE facts are set forth in the following certificate of.the Register, Hon. LINCOLN CLARK.-This being the day fixed for the
second meeting of creditors at the office of the Register for the
purpose of hearing the assignee's report, and 'for declaring a
dividend of assets among those entitled thereto, Oliver R. Butler
claimed a dividend as creditor of the bankrupt, upon a proof of
claims heretofore filed in the sum of ten thousand two hundred
and fifteen dollars and- forty-three cents ($10,215 _f%).
The proofs consist of twelve promissory notes, each for the
sum of $750, made by the said Jewett to the said Butler; dated
February 1st 1867, payable the 1st of May 1868, and on the
1st of each and every month thereafter 'until the whole, should
be paid.
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The said Oliver R. Butler had been copartner with the bank.
rupt for ten years anterior to the 1st day of February 1867, at
which time he sold his entire interest in the firm to the said
Frederick Jewett for about the sum of $25,000, and took from
him his promissory notes in payment therefor. It appeared in
evidence, by the deposition of the said Jewett, that the notes
hereinbefore described were a portion of those given in the purchase of the interest of the said Butler.
Ctarksoni attorney for a portion of the creditors, and also for
the assignee, objected, that the said .Oliver R. Butler was not
entitled to a dividend upon those notes. I sustained the objection, and decided-that no dividend could be allowed upon the
proof of them.
'Waller, attorney for Butler, desired the matter to be certified
to the court, the question being as to whether the said Butler
was entitled to a dividend upon the basis of the said notes.
It appeared that the joibt indebtedness -of Jewett & Butler
was some $16,000, no portion of which liad been paid by Butler,
That Jewett, after the purchase of Butler's interest, bought but
very few goods, from which the inference is clear, that, had Butler been allowed to receive a dividend, he would have taken the
proceeds of assets liable to the payment of his own debts, at the
same time that he had not, as partner, paid the partnership debts.
That Butler. could not have a dividend until alI the partnership
debts' were paid, seems to me clear. Whether, after that, he
would come in to share with the individual creditors, is a ques"
tion not now calling for consideration.
Ditu OND, J.-.In this case, it appearing that the only fund
for payment is the individual property of the bankrupt, I have
no doubt that there can be no dividend allowed to Butler so long
as there is anything due from him.- The decision-of the Register
is cansequently correct.

'F(fRD r. FLINT.

Supreme Court of Vermont..
WASHINGTON FORD v. AUGUSTUS FLINT ET AL.
A. made a deed by which he granted and conveyed certain lands to his daughter
B. 11during her lifetime, and to her eldest son, which shall be living at her deceas ,
,rnd to his eldest son at his decease, and so on from eldest son to eldest son to the
latest generation," habendurn to B. "1and to her heirs as aforesaid." This deed
he never delivered, but after his death it was found in his papers and delivered by
his administrator to B., who went into possession under it, and afterwards made a
deed in fee for the same premises to C., who held by himself and his grantees in
fed for thirty-six years. Held,
1. That B. took a life estate only.
2. That her eldest son living at her decease took a fee tail directly from the
original grantor.
3. That the only title B. took and conveyed and C. took and held under B. was
under color of the deed from A., and therefore both B. and C. and the subsequent
purchasers under-them were estopped from disputing the validity of A.'s deed,
because it was not delivered in the lifetime of the grantor.
4. That C. took with notice of the title of B.'s eldest son, and his possession
was not adverse so long as B. lived.
5: That the deed from A. to B. being on record, was notice to all'subsequent
'purchasers of the extent of B.'s'title.

'Fifield, for plaintiff.
Clark

.1owell, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARRETT, J.-This i*s ejectment for a parcel of laud, part of
the home farm formerly owned by Nathaniel Spear, who died in
January 1826. On the 15th day of November 1819, he made
and executed deeds of separate parcels of said farm to each of
several of his children, but kept said deeds in his own possession
until his death. The day after his death, one of his sons, who
was subsequently appointed administrator of his estate, delivered
said d euds to the respective grantees therein named. One of said
deeds, covering and conveying the land sued for in this writ,
was to Aseneth Ford'. a daughter of said Nathaniel, in and
by which he did "give, grant, convey, and confirm unto' her,
the said Aseneth, during her lifetime, and to her eldest son
which shall be living at her decease, and to his eldest son at
his decease, and so on from eldest son to eldest son, to the
latest generation," &c.: habendum "unto s'aid Aseneth and to
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her heirs as aforesaid," &c., followed by the usual covenants of
warranty.
It appeared that said Aseneth and her husband, in the spring
of 1826-the spring next after the January in which her father
died--went into possession of said premises under claim of title
by virtue of said deed from Nathaniel Spear, and remained in
possession until 1829, when she sold and conveyed in fee said
premises to Brown by deed of warranty, who then took possession
and held till he conveyed in fee by deed of warranty ; and after
that the premises passed by like deeds of warranty through
several successive owners to the present defendants, each of whom
tobk possession at the time of his respective deed, and held till
he conveyed as aforesaid, and the defendants are now in possession. The said Aseneth died March 1st 1865, her husband still
surviving. The present plaintiff is her eldest son living at the
time of her decease.- The plaintiff claims title ia himself by vir.tue of said deed of Nathaniel Spear. Ohe ground of defence
is, that that deed created an estate tail, or a conditional fee
at common law, unaffected by the statute de Donis; and that the
entail was barred by the deed of warranty in fee of Aseneth to
Brown, and that Brown took an absolute title in fee under that
deed. The plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that his mother took
only an estate for life, and, on her death, that he took in remainder, and is &ititlecl to hold according to the form of the gift-.
the title thereafter to go -to such persons, and in such manner, as
the laws of this state shall warrant.
The conditional fee or estate tail at common law, before the
statute de Donis, was created by a conveyance to the donee of an
estate that would have been an absolute f~e simple, were it not
limited by the condition, viz., of issue being born, who, according to the form of the gift, were to take hy inheritance from the
donee of the conditional fee. In conformity with this idea, all
the special rules were devised, adopted, and applied, tbai governed the rights of parties in respect to such estates, as the right
of the donee on the birth of the prescribed issue to convey an
absolute fee simple, and thus bar the issue of the right to take,
as well as the donor of the right to the reversion. Of course the
donee could not convey such absolute fee simple, unless it had
been vested in him by the form and effect of the gift, contingent
at first, to be sure, upon the perfo'mance of the condition by the
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birth of the prescribed issue. "It wns a fee simple on condition
that the donee had issue :" 2 BI. Com. 110. By the gift, the
entire title passed from the donor, subject only to the possibility
of reverter. During the life of the donee, the property and
estate were vested in the donee beyond all power of the donor
to affect the character of the estate. Upon the birih of issue,
the absolute and unqualified disposition of it was in the donee;
and if such donee made a conveyance of the fee, the grantee
took such fee as against both the original donor and the heirs to
whom the estate was limited: 4 Kent's Cor. 11 et seq. ; 4 Cruise
Digest, by Greenl. 68, §§ 5,; 6, 7; Co. Lit. 19 a (by Thomas,
vol. 1, p. 507 et seq.). In Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 233,
Oh. J. DYER said, "The fee simple vested at the begifining,
though by issue the donee had power to alien, which he had not
before, but the issue was not the cause of having the fee,
but the first' gift." On p. 250, "Further, as to the 6ommon
law before the statute, if land had been given to a man and to
his heirs of his-body begotten, this was not taken to be a full and
peifect inheritance, until the donee had issue of his body
'*
But (as I take it) it was a fee simple presently before issue, but
tlie having of issue made it more full than it was before ; for after
issue he had power to alien, and thereby to bar the issues and the
donor," &c., &c. In the margin it is said, herewith agree 1
Finch 100, 2 Id. 121..
In the case before us the deed, in the. granting part, does not
purport to convey a fee, either simple or conditional, to Aseneth,
but only an estate for life. By the terms of the grant,- the estate
in her would not be conditional at all. It would not depend 'on
any contingency for its character, or as to her rights in respectto it.

It would be the same in her, whether any of the prescribed
after-takers should be born during her life, or in existence at her
death or not. No fee of any kind having been conveyed to her,
there would be no quality of estate existing in her on which the
birth or existence of any of.the prescribed sons could operate to
invest hr with any different title, or incidents of title, from that
specifically defined in the grant.
If a conditional 'fee or an estate tail was created at all by the
grant of the deed, it was created in the plaintiff, and-not in h;s

-

FORD v. FLINT.

mother. It is in this respect like the case of Owen v. Smyth, 2
H. Bk. Rep. 594.
This view would seem to be conclusive against the ground
of defence now under consideration, unless upon the face of the
whole instrument, by construction, the intent was manifested on
the part of said Nathaniel to create an estate tail or conditional
fee in said Aseneth, and the instrument itself has the legal requisites for such a purpose. The granting part of the deed expressly
gives the land to her during her lifetime, and to her eldest son
living at her decease and to the successive eldest sons as named.
These are mere words ofp.urchase, and not of inheritance. It is
conceded that, in order to constitute an estate tail, the land must
pass from the original donee by inheritance to the next one entitled,-that is, he 'Must take as heir from her, and-not as grantee
from the party.creating the estate-that she must take and hold
the whole estate under the deed, with no limitation on its quality,
except as it is affected by the restriction to the specific line of
direct heirship,
While it is further conceded that the words of th6 granting
part of the deed would not create such an estate, for want of
.words of inheritance, it is claimed that resort may. properly be
had to the habendun., upon familiar rules governixig the construction of such instruments, and that the word heirs" therein supplies what is lacking in the granting part of the deed, and sfiows
that !he designation of.the eldest sons in succession is to be con-strued as equivalent to the expression ",the eldest male heirs of
her body in succession." We assent to the propriety of the rules
invoked, but fail to find them efficacious for the desired purpose,
The meaning of the word "heirs" is not confined to its technical
import of a taker by inheritance. If not affected by other lan.
guage in the instrument, that sense, and a corresponding'-legal
effect, would be given to it. But when used in connection with
other language describing and designating the same subject, the
whole is to be taken into consideration, and a meaning is to be
assigned to the word according to what shall appear to be its
intended sense, within the scope which both law and use have rendered it susceptible of. Now, in the habendum, "to her the said
Aseneth Ford, and to her heirs as aforesaid," &c., is the expression. There is a slight peculiarity in this that is consistent with,
if it does not indicate, the purpose of excluding the idea that the
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sons were to take as heirs of the mother. The usual form in corn
mon deeds conveying an estate of inheritance would be, "to he,
the said Aseneth, her heirs and assigns," &c., leaving out the
words- used in this deed, "and to" (her heirs, &c.), which, as
nsed in this case and context, may seem to indicate separable and
disconnected interests and rights to be had and held by her, and
by Iier heirs. But "to her and to her heirs as aforesaid," shows
that the grantor did not intend to change, by enlargement or
otherwise, just what was imported by the language in the granting
part of the deed, and that "teirs" was used as descriptio personarum,-as a comprehensive single word, to mean the same
thing as, and as a substitute for the specific designation in the
granting part, of the persons to take after the said Aseneth. See
remarks of Lord TJiURLOW in Jones v. Morgan, I Bro. Ch. .Rep.
219.
It does not import that she or they are to take in any different
character, or any different quality of estate, from the character
assigned and the estate created in the grant. She is to hold as
aforesaid; her heirs are to hold as aforesaid-she to hold
during her lifetime ; her eldest son living at her decease to hold
npxt under said grant, and his eldest son, and his eldest son, and
so on, to hold in succession.
Under this construction the plaintiff would not take by inheritance from his mother, but in remainder after her special estate
had terminated. The case, therefore, does not call for a consideration of much of the learning adduced in the argurment on the
subject of estates tail under the common law, as affected by the
statute de -Donis, and the system, which, in process of time, came
into existence, of barring entails by fine or common recovery, anl
as affected by the statutes, constitutions, and adjudications in this
and other states of the Union.
II. In view of such construction of the deed, for the purpose
of defeating title in the plaintiff under it, it is claimed that the
defendants are entitled to impeach its validity, for the reason that
it was never delivered by the grantor.
As already stated, Nathaniel Spear kept this and the- other
deeds to said several children up to the time of his death, and the
day after his death his son and subsequent administrator found
said deeds among his father's papers, and he then delivered theia
to the respective grantees named therein, in the presence of tl.e

FORD v. FLINT.

widow and some of the heirs, none of whom objected, and rfone
of the heirs nor the administrator have ever questioned the validity
of said deed to Aseneth.
The case shows that directly, and in due course of law, the
estate of said Nathaniel was settled, and distribution made of it
betwe en his several children, and therein the whole of his real
estate of which he died seised ;as appraised; the parcels conveyed by said deeds were appraised and were reckoned as
advancement to each of the grantees respectively, and said
grantees were made equal to the other children by apportioning
his other real estate between all his children in parcels to make
the vallue to each equal. in doing this, 3J acres were set off to
Aseneth, valued at $27.33. A like quantity and value was set
off to, Jacob Spear.
These parcels, with said -advancements,
made to them .657.33 each. 'To each of the other children other
parcels of land of the value of $657.33 were set off. Each took
and held the respective parcels under said- deeds and the apportionment thus made by the Probate Court. Now, it will be noticed
that Aseneth and Jacob, to whom said deeds of Nathaniel had
been delivered, did not take the land described- in said deeds
under and by virtue of said apportionment, but under and by
virtue of the deeds themselves, which -were treated by all the parties interdsted in the estate of said Nathaniel as having already
taken effect to invest said Aseneth and Jacob with the title to
said'respective parcels described therein. Advancement impliesproperty already vested in and owned by the party advanced.
Said 3J acres apportioned to each of them, and the larger parcels
apportioned to the other brothers who had not been advanced,
were held by each respectively by virtue of and under said
apportionment. Thus their respective rights accrued, and, as
between themselves, have always been asserted, recognised, and
acted on.
It is clear, then, that it would not be allowable for Aseneth
herself to deny the valid delivery of said deed to her.
She
treated it, and all interested treated it as giving her a valid title
from the time of its coming into her hands. She took possession
under it, and held such possession for nearly a year before said
apportionment by the Probate Court was made ; she having taken
possession in the spring of 1826, and said apportionment not
having been made till the 15th of March 1827. Her title, then,
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to the land in question clearly accrued to her under and by virtue of that deed, and she held and occupied, under it till 1829,
when she conveyed by deed of warranty in fee to Brown, who
entered and occupied thereunder till he conveyed by like deed;
and the land has passed by like deeds successively to the defendants. Neither she, nor Brown, nor any one in the chain of title,
nor *thedefendants, have ever claimed by virtue of any other paper
title ; nor by any other title only such as may have been acquired
by possession under eolor given by said -deeds; and the defendants now claim, as one ground of defence, by a-title acquired by
adverse possession under. color of title given by said deed of
Aseneth to Brown.
Now, it is clear that that deed of Aseneth to Brown conveyed
only the title and quality of estate that she had ; and the deed
by which such title and estate in her were created being on
record, execdted with all due formality, would be notice to all
the world of the estate which she held and could convey, and so
would preclude any ground to a subsequent grantee for asserting
any fraud upon him in this respect, so far as the impart and
apparent validity of the deed is concerned, whatever might be
bis rights upon the covenants of warranty in the deed taken by
him. By treating the deed of Nathaniel to Aseneth as valid to
secure to her, and to them, all the title and estate that it purported to convey to her, and, through her whole life, from 1826
to 1865, having held and enjoyed the premises under the rights
which she thus acquired, as against all persons interested in the
estate of said Nathaniel, it would seem not allowable aow for the
defendants to assert the invalidity of said deed for want of valid
delivery, against a party entitled by said deed to the premises as
an estate in remainder, upon the, termination of the life estate
created in Aseneth by said deed.
In thus holding upon the case before us, we are not to be understood as deciding the question very much discussed in the able
arguments of counsel, and ruled in many 9f the cases cited, whether the defendants .might not set up a title'in said Aseneth
superior to and independent of the deed in question. .In-thls
case no such title is averred, or attempted to be shown. We
therefore leave that question untouched.
A question made as to the validity of. the proceedings of the
Probate Court in making said apportionment and distribution of
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the estate of said Nathaniel between*his children, we regard as
settled and quieted by lapse of time.
III. The defendants claim that they have a good title as
against the plaintiff by adverse possession.
This suh.ect presents itself for consideration in two aspects:1st. Have the defendants and those under whom they hold been
in adverse possession to the plaintiff? 2d. Has the plaintiff been
in such a position, iii the view of the law, that he could assert
title and right of possession in himself ?
Under the first aspect, it is to be noticed 11that the defendants,
for the purpose of showing color of title to said premises, gave in
evidence the deed-of warranty from said Aseneth to Brown, dated
May 5th 1829, and it appeared that Brown went into possession
immediately after buying of said Aseneth, and Brown and
his grantees have ben in possession ever since."
Again: "The defendants further gave evidenbe tending to
show that Brown went into possession of the demanded premises
at the time he.took his deed from said Aseneth, claiming to own
the fee of said premises, and that he ai~d his grantees have ever
since been in possession of said premises, claiming to own them,
and' purchased them, supposing at the time of the purchase that
they were getting a good title in fee." Again : "There was no
evidence that said Brown, or any of his grantees, had ever notified the plaiiitiff, or any one else , that they claimed the land
adversely to the plaintiff, or adversely to their deed, or under
their deed, except what is to be implied from taking it and putting
it on record."
These extracts from the bill of exceptions show that Brown
and his grantees entered under the deed bf Aseneth to Brown,
and claimed under that deed throughout. This is manifest by
force of the statements themselves, as 'vell as by.the legal intendment, from giving the deed in evidence to show color. of title.
The showing of color is a technical form of saying that the party
claims to have entered and held under the deed by him presented.
In this case the idea is conclusively excluded that Brown, or any
of his grantees, ever claimed to anybody to hold in any other
right than that created by said deed to Brown, and from him to
his successors in the title. To what, then, shall the character of
the entry and possession by him and his successors be referred ?
It seems to us to present a strong case for the application of the
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principle stated and applied in Brooks v. Captlin, 3 Vt. R. 281,
in which case the plaintiff made title by deeds from Phelps
through Smith, which had been on rec6rd for many years. In
June 1828 the defendant entered and commenced improvements
on the premises, which were then wild, and continued in possession till ejected b.y that suit. In October 1828 the defendant
took a quit-claim deed of the premises of the heirs of said Phelps,
who had deceased. It was urged for the defendant that, as his
possession commenced before he took his -quit-claim, or proved to
have been in communication with his grantors for the purchase,
he had a right, on the failure of that title, to rest upon his antecedent possession, and put the plaintiff on the proof of a perfect
title in himself. It was held that the defendant's possession
before he took said deed became merged in the supposed title
acquired by the purchase. RoYcE, J., said: "The defendant
having no right 'of his own, admitted that of the heirs and took
shelter under it. And this admission cannot now be revoked by
him for .the -purpose of acquiring greater privileges at the trial in
the character of a mere trespasser, than he is entitled to claim in
that of purchaser." So it may be said in. this case ; the. defendants having no right except in virtue of a possession taken and held
under Aseneth Ford, by taking possession under her, admitted
her right as it existed and was shown by the record, and cannot
now be permitted to ignore and repudiate the character of. the
possession which they thus held, and to now assert, as giving
themn a title against the plaintiff, a possession without' right and
as mere trespassers. gee Adams on Eject. (ed. 1821)"47 et seg.
and notes.
. The defendants, then, were holding under the deed fromAseneth tu Brown, and of course were holding according to the
legal effect of that deed. That deed took effect. upon, and con%reyedthe title and estate which the grantor had in the premises
conveyed, and that was an estate for her life, created by the deed
of her father to her, remainder to the plaintiff and the successors
named. Now, the possession under such a title was not adverse
to the plaintiff, for the reason that it was perfectly consistent witA
his title and right under the same deed from which said Aseneth
and her grantees derived their title and estate. The deed of said
Nathaniel Spear to Aseneth, being duly recorded and apparently
valid, was notice to all subsequent holders of the real state of
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the tide and interest both of said Aseneth and the plaintiff; and
Brown and his grantees stand charged, so far as the plaintiff is
concerned, with knowledge of his title and estate, and cannot now
be permitted, by virtue of acts that were entirely consistent with
the plaintiff's title, and in no manner indicated any claim adverse
to it, to, assert that the deeds of Aseneth to Brown and of him to
successive grantees, and the possession under said deeds, have
been adverse to the plaintiff's title and estate.
It may be further remarked that the plaintiff stands upon the
deed of Nathaniel Spear to his mother, Aseneth, recorded January 26th 1826, which then and thenceforward became and was
fully operative, bbth to create and establish his title and estate,
and to notify all persons coming into the chain of title, or obtaining any interest in the property, just what his title and estate
were. Standing thus, he is entirely unaffected by records of
subsequent conveyances to which he was not a party. He is not
chargeable with notice and knowledge thaf the defendants were
claiming a title in fee, because his mother had given a warranty
deed in fee to Brown, and from Brown the property had been
conveyed by like successive .deeds to- the defendants, and all of
said deeds had been duly recorded: Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. R.
195.
Upon this aspect, then, the case stands thus- The defendants
entered undel- a claim of title derived by the deed of Aseneth
FordS to Brown, and possession has ever been held under that
claim; that deed conveyed only an estate for the life of said
Aseneth ; the plaintiff held an estate in reiiiainder in the premises
after said life estate; he had no notice nor knowledge of any
claim as against his title and estate ; none has been made ; the
.possession has been consistent with his title. We think he has
not lost his title by adverse possession.
Under the second aspect it is sufficient to, remark, that if the
plaintiff had known that the defendants and their predecesiors in
the occupancy, were claiming to hold and occupy adversely to
his title, he could not be injured by it, for the reason that he
could not assert his title as against their possession and claim during the life of his mother, which terminated in 1865. If she had
not conveyed, she could have held during her life. Having
conveyed her title and interest, her grantees could enjoy the same
with all the rights and immunities that appertained to her.
VOL. XVI.-20
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The claim of the defendants to be allowed for improvements
made during their possession, by way of offset or recoupment to
the mesne profits to which the plaintiff is entitled, was properly
disposed of by the County Court.
The judgment for the plaintiff is affirmed.

The -District Court of the United Statesfor the Western Distriet of Michigan.
THE UNITED STATES v. JAMES H. FAIRCHILDS. 1
The 12th and 13th sections of the Act of Congress, approved July 4th 1864,
limiting the compensation of agents and other persons for making and causing to
be executed the necessary papers to establish a claim for pension, bounty, or other
allowance before the-pension office, to ten dollars, and declaring it to, be a high
misdemeanor for any such person to demand or receive any greater compensation
than ten dollart for his services under the Pension Act, &c., &c., is not unconstitutionat. Congress had power to pass an act with such provisions, under those
clauses of the Constitution which declare that ," Congress shall hare power to raise
and support armies," and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
the Constitution in the government of the United States," provided, in the judgment
of Congress, such provisions were thus necessary and proper at the time they were
adopted.
FAIRCHILDS was indicted at the May Term, under sections 12
and 13 of the Act of Congress approved July 4th 1864, 13 Stat.
at Large, p. 389.
The 12th section limits the compensation to be received by an
agent or other person, for making out and causing to be executed
the necessary papers to establish a claim for pension, bounty, or
other allowance before the pension office, to $10.
Section 13 declares it to be a high misdemeanor for such agent
or other person to demand or 'eceive any greater compensation
for his services under the Pension Act referred to than is prescribed in section 12, and a like offence to contract or agree to
prosecute any claim for a pension, bounty, or other allowanc4
under the act, on the condition that he receives a percentage
upon any portion of the amount of such claim, or to wrongfully
I
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withhold from a pensioner or other claimant the whole or aniy part
of the pension or claim allowed and due to such pensioner or
claimant; upon conviction such person to be fined not exceeding
$300, or imprisoned not exceeding two years, or both, according
to the circumstances and aggravation of the offence.
The indictment charges that Fairchilds wrongfully withheld
$64.52 from Penrose, a pensioner, part of $174.52 collected and
received by Fairchilds as pension-money allowed and due Penrose from the United States.
Penrose is a discharged soldier, and as such was entitled to a
pension. He employed- Fairchilds to obtain such pension, which
Fairchilds did, and received from the pension office $174.52.
Of this he paid Penrose $110, retaining and withholding the
balance as compensation for services.
Fairchilds demurred to the indictment on the ground that no
offence was- charged.
Opinion of the court by
WITIEY, J.-It is argued that Congress has no power, under
the Constitution, to define as- an offence that which is charged
against Fairchilds. The question is, therefore, one of the constitutional power of Congress. Sections 12 and 13 are claimed to
be unconstitutional.
It is argued by the learned counsel for Fairchilds that ]kirchilds was the agent of Penrose and not of the government, and'
the district attorney does not deny the proposition. From this
it is claimed that the transaction was purely between private
citizens of a state, affected them only, and in no wise the United
States government, nor any officer or agent of the United States;
that these citizens were at liberty to make such bargain as they
pleased in reference to the amount of compensation for services
rendered by one for the other, whether that service related to pension-money or otherwise; and that no law passed by Congress can,
in any regard, control or affect the parties or their rights or dealings under such contract. That when once the pension office paid
the money over to Fairchilds, as the agent of Penrose, it was the
-property of Penrose, and he alone can call his agent to account
for the same ; and if any restriction can be placed upon the question of compensation of the agent, or any penalty be imposed on
the agent for retaining or wrongfully withholding the whole, or
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any portion of such moneys, only state laws can impose such re
strictions and p(nalty. That there can be no offence by a citizen
which both sovereignties can punish; if the one has the power,
the other has not. That the state may exercise the power, and,
therefore, the national government cannot.
It must be conceded that the line between state and national
jurisdiction is not always clearly defined, and great care is demanded of the courts in passing upon a question like that involved
inthis case.
The Congress. of the United States has, by the passage of the
act in question, declared that the power exists under the Constitution of the United States, to protect the fund for the claimant,
and limit tlie compensation which an agent or attorney shall receive for services rendered to one entitled to a pension in procuring the same. To warrant the courts in setting aside this law as
unconstitutional, the case must be so clear that no reasonable
doubt can be said to exist: Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 128. And
especially is this so when the question is to be decided by a court
of limited or inferior jurisdiction.
The constitutionality of the Act of Congress is,,however, made
a question, and there is no reason why this court should not con.
sider and pass upon it.
In construing the extent of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, we are to look at the'language of. the
instrument which confers those powers in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred.
What, then, are the constitutional provisions underwhich it is
claimed. Congress could pass the act defining the offence char-ged
in this case ? The words of the Constitution are: " Congress
shall have power to raise and support armies," and "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into ex.cution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the government of the United States :" Art. 1,
sec. 8.
The Supreme Court.of the United States in AfoCulloch v. S'tate
of Maryland, 4 Wheat. R. 316, hold that "although among the
enumerated powers of government, we do not.find-the word
' bank' or ' incorporation,' we find the great powers to lay and
collect taxes; to borrow money ; to regulate commerce ; to declare
and conduct war; and to raise and support -armies and navies;"
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and that "a government, intrusted with such ample powers, on
the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the
nation so vitally depend, must also be intrusted with ample means
for their execution." That the Constitution of the United States
"does not profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it
confers may be executed ;" that "the government which has a
right to do an act, and has imposed upon it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed
to select the means."
By the aid of the profound views thus expressed by Chief Justice MARSHALL, let us examine the question before us. Congress
is expressly empowered to "raise and support armies," and we
shall do well to remember that Congress are to be allowed, according to the ruling I have read, to select the means by which armies
are io be raised and supported. In selecting the means to accomplish these things, 'we find .pay, bounties, and pensions are stipulated and promised to the soldier. Through these means, thousands
who could not btherwise afford= to leave all and enter the military
service, come forward, enlist, and do battle to protect and defend
the rights, interests, and honor of the nation. By the use of
these means the governinent is enabled readily to raise an army
and fill its ranks from time to time.
Pensions anmd bounties are not given for the support of -the
army, but promised by way of inducement and reward for the citizen becoming a soldier and faithfully serving his- country.
There is no express power given in the Constitution to Congress
to give pensions or bounties to the soldier. "Thd right is claimed,
however, and has never beQn doubted as being within those inci-,
dental or implied powers flowing from the expressly granted or
enumerated power, to "raise and support armies." They are
among the means which it selects in the exercise of a granted
power, and I apprehend Congress is the sole judge as t9 what
means are appropriate and to be selected in the exercise of any
of its enumerated powers. Most of the penal laws of the government of the United States rest upon the incidental or implied
powers of Congress to punish violations of its laws. It was well
argued by the district attorney, that under the power to regulate
commerce, Congress has passed laws regulating vessels engaged
in carrying passengers, in prescribing the size of state-rooms and
otherwise, as well as in requiring vessels to convey disabled
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American seamen found in a foreign port to this country. And,
again, laws forbidding the sale of bounty certificates, as well as
many other statutes of a like character, none of which have been
held unconstitutional, nor judicially questioned, so far as I know;
and yet these statutes find no sanction in the Constitution of the
United States other than in the implied powers, and the general
provision "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution" the powers vested in the government.
If, then, Congress may promise bounties and pensions to the
nation's soldiers, may it not, by appropriate penalties, guard
those rewards against him who would divert them in any manner
away from the beneficiary ? If the soldier may lawfully be
promised bounties and pensions, and if, from his occupation of
arms and want of the requisite. knowledge, he must employ
another to prepare the requisite evidence to the pension office to
bring him withiik the law and secure the promised bounty and
pension, may not the government say to such employee, This
money we pay to you for one of our soldiers, and you must pay
it over to him intact; failing in which you make yourself liable
to fine and imprisonment ? True, the employee is the agent of
the soldier in all that he does for him, but he must deal with the
government in the exercise of that agency ; and in taking such
employment to secure for the discharged soldier his biunty or"
pension, he knows the restrictions placed by Congress upon the
compensation he can receive, and the- prohibition against his
retaining any portion of the funds from the soldier. These provisions may.be r~garded as the terms and conditions upon whibh
the government consents to recognise the agency of the person.
employed'by the soldier and pays the money over to such agent.
Congress must alone be the sole judge of what is both necessary
and expedient on any subject within the range' of its powers
to act.
"To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally under.
stood as employing any means calculated td produce the end."
Congress has emplo'yed a means in raising and supporting
armies, in addition to pay, clothing, &c., bounties and pensions,
and has sought by appropriate penalties to guard these moneys
through all channels from the nation's treasury into the hands
of the pensioner.
Said the Supreme Court, in the case already referred to, "let

